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Possession of ‘‘Extreme” Pornography:
Where’s the Harm?
Jonathan Clough*
For decades, the traditional Western liberal approach to obscene material has
been that while the availability of such material may be restricted, individuals are
free to possess it so long as they do not distribute to others. Prior to the advent of
the Internet, traditional means of control were effective in limiting the availability
of such material. However, free of traditional restrictions the Internet allows easy
access to a vast array of pornographic material, some of which challenges the most
liberal of societies including images of child abuse, sexual violence, bestiality, and
necrophilia. In 2008, the UK became one of the first Western countries to
criminalize the possession of ‘‘extreme pornographic material.” This article
considers the rationales used to justify such an offence and in particular the
parallels drawn with possession of child pornography. Although ostensibly justified
by arguments based on the prevention of harm, the offence is more clearly explained
as a reaction to the difficulty of enforcing existing obscenity laws. A person’s right
to read and view what they please in private is therefore sacrificed for the need to
restrict the availability of online content. Such an approach may be applied to
obscene material more generally, or any other prohibited online content such as
terrorism-related material. It is argued that a more nuanced approach may allow
the production and distribution of such material to be targeted, while allowing the
sanctity of a person’s library to remain untouched.

INTRODUCTION
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court considered the validity of a
Georgia statute that criminalized the simple possession of obscene material. 1 At
the time, the Court had already accepted an important state interest in regulating
the production and distribution of such material.2 It was, however, the first time
the Court had considered whether that interest could extend to allow ‘‘state
inquiry into the contents of. . .[a person’s] library.”3 The Court held that it could

*
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3

Professor, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Australia. A paper based on this article
was presented at the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law Conference,
Edinburgh, June 2015. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to Helena Kanton for her research
assistance..
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) [Stanley]. ‘‘Simple possession” refers to an
offence of possession that does not require proof of an additional fault element such as
‘‘with intent to distribute”.
See the cases cited at n. 99.
Stanley, supra note 1 at 565.
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not, finding the statute invalid for violating the right to free speech under the
First Amendment.4
This view reflected the ‘‘traditional liberal approach” that was, and is,
adopted in most Western countries.5 That is, while it may be unlawful to produce
or distribute obscene material, it is not an offence to possess it. Prior to the
advent of the Internet, such an approach could effectively limit the availability of
obscene material. However, the decentralized nature of modern communications
bypasses traditional attempts at regulation, reigniting longstanding debates
about censorship, morality, sexual freedom, and freedom of expression. 6
In pre-Internet days, individuals who wished to view this kind of
material would need to seek it out, bring it into their home or have it
delivered in physical form as magazines, videos, photographs etc,
risking discovery and embarrassment at every stage. Now they are able
to access it from their computers at home (or from their place of work)
with relative ease.7

This lack of control allows access to material—including depictions of child
abuse, sexual violence, bestiality, and necrophilia—that challenges even the most
liberal of societies. While many jurisdictions moved to criminalize the simple
possession of child pornography,8 it remained lawful to possess other forms of
obscene material. It was the murder of a British woman, Jane Longhurst, which
ultimately led to a major reform of the law governing possession of obscene
material in the United Kingdom.
On 19 April 2003, Jane’s burning body was found on Wigginholt Common,
West Sussex.9 Graham Coutts, the boyfriend of one of Jane’s friends, was
subsequently convicted of her murder.10 The prosecution had alleged that Coutts
4

5
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9
10

‘‘Congress shall make no law. . .abridging the freedom of speech”: U.S. Const. amend I.
This issue is discussed in more detail below.
Lilian Edwards, ‘‘Pornography, Censorship and the Internet” in Lilian Edwards &
Charlotte Waelde, eds, Law and the Internet, 3rd ed (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 623
at 633 [Edwards, ‘‘Pornography, Censorship and the Internet”].
Angus Hamilton, ‘‘The Net Out of Control—A New Moral Panic: Censorship and
Sexuality” in Liberty, ed, Liberating Cyberspace: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and the
Internet (London, U.K.: Pluto Press, 1999) 169.
U.K., Home Office & Scottish Executive, Consultation: On the Possession of Extreme
Pornographic Material (London, U.K.: 2005) at 6, online: BBC <news.bbc.co.uk/2/
shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_08_05_porn_doc.pdf>.
See below. Although the term ‘‘child pornography” is used widely, it has been criticized
as inviting comparisons with adult pornography: Alisdair A. Gillespie, Child Pornography: Law and Policy (New York: Routledge, 2011) at 1-4 [Gillespie, Law & Policy]. It
is, however, still the most common term used in the literature, legislation, and case law,
and for convenience will be used in this article.
R. v. Coutts (Graham James), [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1605 (Eng. C.A.) at p. 1607 [Coutts].
Coutts’ appeal against conviction was allowed by the House of Lords and remitted to the
Court of Appeal: R. v. Coutts, [2006] 4 All E.R. 353 (U.K. H.L.). His conviction was
quashed and a retrial ordered; ‘‘Teacher murder conviction quashed,” BBC News (19
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had murdered Jane ‘‘in order to satisfy his macabre sexual fantasies. . .[involving]
women who are helpless and being strangled.”11 Two juries12 rejected the defence
case that Jane had died accidentally during ‘‘consensual asphyxial sex.”13
As part of the Crown’s case, evidence was led that, leading up to the time of
Jane’s murder, Coutts had visited a number of websites containing images
classified as ‘‘‘genuine deceased appearance’; ‘asphyxiation and strangulation’;
‘rape torture and violent sex’; and ‘general pornographic.’”14 Although no expert
evidence was led to support a causal link between Coutts viewing this material
and the subsequent murder,15 the evidence was held to be admissible to rebut the
defence of accident.16
In the United Kingdom, this case became a focal point for reform of the law
relating to the possession of violent pornography,17 and was influential in the
government proposal to criminalize the possession of so-called ‘‘extreme
pornographic material.”18 Notwithstanding strongly divided responses to the
government’s proposal, 19 the possession of extreme pornography was
criminalized by section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
(the Act). In doing so, the United Kingdom20 became one of the only Western
countries, and the first in Europe,21 to criminalize the simple possession of
obscene material.22
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October 2006), online: <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/southern_counties/
6065140.stm>.
Coutts, supra note 9 at 1607.
Coutts was convicted of murder for a second time in 2007: ‘‘‘Pervert’ strangled music
teacher,” BBC News (4 July 2007), online: <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/
sussex/6265376.stm>.
Coutts, supra note 9 at 1607.
Ibid at 1614.
Paul Johnson, ‘‘Law, Morality and Disgust: The Regulation of ‘Extreme Pornography’
in England and Wales” (2010) 19:2 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 147 at 149.
Coutts, supra note 9 at 1627.
Andrew D. Murray, ‘‘The Reclassification of Extreme Pornographic Images” (2009)
72:1 Mod. L. Rev. 73 at 73-74.
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 6.
See generally, U.K., Home Office, Consultation on the Possession of Extreme
Pornographic Material: Summary of Responses and Next Steps (London, U.K.: Home
Office, 2006), online: <www.spannertrust.org/documents/Gvt-response-extremeporn.pdf>. For a summary of responses to the consultation process see Murray, supra
note 17 at 78-79.
The provision applies only to England, Wales and Northern Ireland: Criminal Justice
and Immigration Act 2008 (U.K.), c. 4, s. 152(3)(c) [CJIA]. A similar provision was
enacted in Scotland: Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act, A.S.P. 2010, c. 13,
s.42 [CJIL]. This provision is discussed further below.
Abhilash Nair, ‘‘‘Caveat Viewer!’: The Rationale of the Possession Offence” (2008) 22:12 Intl. Rev. L. Comp. & Tech. 157 at 161 [Nair, ‘‘Caveat Viewer”].
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Not surprisingly, this reform was highly controversial and was extensively
criticized.23 Beyond the specific criticisms of the UK provision, such an offence
raises broader issues about the criminalization of possession as a means of
regulating content online—shifting the focus of enforcement from producers,
distributors, and intermediaries to the end user.
This article begins with a discussion of the meaning and availability of
extreme pornography, followed by a discussion of the traditional regulation of
obscenity and its place within the regulation of free speech. Each of the specific
rationales offered to justify criminalization of possession will then be analyzed,
with a particular focus on child pornography laws which were offered as a
precedent for such an offence. Finally, the utility of an offence of possession
when applied to the digital context will be examined. Although focusing on the
United Kingdom reforms, this article also draws upon the perspectives of
cognate common law jurisdictions including Australia, Canada and the United
States.
It will be argued that while rhetorically powerful, analogies with child
pornography do not withstand close scrutiny. Although ostensibly justified by
arguments based on the prevention of harm, the offence is more clearly explained
as a reaction to the difficulty of enforcing existing obscenity laws. The offence of
possession becomes a means to enforce the censorship of certain forms of
obscene material which cannot be enforced using conventional means. A
person’s right to read and view what they please in private is therefore sacrificed
for the need to restrict the availability of online content, the vast majority of
which originates overseas and which is not subject to international agreement, let
alone international enforcement.
It will be argued that if such material is to be criminalized, the true gravamen
of the offence lies in bringing such material into the jurisdiction, conduct which is
already prohibited. Rather than punishing possession, a more targeted offence of
accessing, limited to the online environment, would allow such conduct to be
criminalized while leaving the right of possession intact. Such an approach may
be applied to obscene material more generally, or to any other prohibited online
content, allowing the production and distribution of such material to be

22

23

The government was unaware of any Western jurisdiction which criminalized the simple
possession of extreme material: Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 13.
However, the simple possession of material that is ‘‘refused classification” is an offence in
Western Australia: Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Enforcement Act 1996 (W.A.), ss. 62, 81, 89 [CEA (W.A.)].
See generally Johnson, supra note 15; Murray, supra note 17; Nair, ‘‘Caveat Viewer,”
supra note 21; Jacob Rowbottom, ‘‘Obscenity Laws and the Internet: Targeting the
Supply and Demand” [2006] Crim. L. Rev. 97. In support of such an offence, see
generally Clare McGlynn & Erika Rackley, ‘‘Criminalising Extreme Pornography: A
Lost Opportunity” (2009) 4 Crim. L. Rev. 245 [McGlynn & Rackley, ‘‘Criminalisation”;
Clare McGlynn & Erika Rackley, ‘‘Striking a Balance: Arguments for the Criminal
Regulation of Extreme Pornography” (2007) Crim. L. Rev. 677.

POSSESSION OF ‘‘EXTREME’’ PORNOGRAPHY

135

criminalized, while allowing the sanctity of a person’s library to remain
untouched.

I. DEFINING ‘‘EXTREME” PORNOGRAPHY: WOULD YOU KNOW IT
IF YOU SAW IT?24
Digital technology has profoundly changed the way we access and distribute
written and visual material. Digital images may be produced, copied, and
distributed in large volumes, with minimal cost and relative anonymity.
Convergence allows production, distribution, and access to occur seamlessly,
while the global nature of the Internet means that material may be accessed from
anywhere in the world. The amount of content available online is truly
staggering. There is estimated to be in excess of one trillion web sites,25 and over
300 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute, with over 1 billion
users.26
An area where this transformation has been keenly felt is access to
pornography, which is both widely available and widely sought. In 2012 it was
reported that XVideos, one of the largest pornographic websites, received over 4
billion page views per month—three times the page views of CNN and easily
within the top 500 websites.27 Another large adult site, YouPorn, hosted over 100
terabytes of pornography and served over 100 million page views per day.28
It has been estimated that of the one million most popular websites in 2010,
about 4% were sex-related,29 while approximately 13% of Internet searches were
for erotic content.30 A 2006 report into the effectiveness of Internet filters
estimated that 1.1% of a random sample of webpages were ‘‘‘adult
entertainment.’”31 Although a relatively small proportion of webpages, ‘‘‘adult
24

25

26
27

28
29

30
31

Justice Stewart famously said, when referring to the difficulty of defining hard core
pornography: ‘‘I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it”: Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184 (1964) at p. 197 [Jacobellis].
Austl., Commonwealth, Law Reform Commission, Classification: Content Regulation
and Convergent Media (ALRC Report No. 118) (Sydney: Australian Law Reform
Commission, 2012) at 25, online: <https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/
publications/final_report_118_for_web.pdf> [ALRC, Classification].
YouTube, Statistics, online: <http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html>.
Sebastian Anthony, ‘‘Just how big are porn sites?,” Extreme Tech (4 April 2012), online:
<www.extremetech.com/computing/123929-just-how-big-are-porn-sites>.
Ibid.
Julie Ruvolo, ‘‘How Much of the Internet is Actually for Porn?,” Forbes (7 September
2011), online: <www.forbes.com/sites/julieruvolo/2011/09/07/how-much-of-the-internet-is-actually-for-porn>.
Ibid.
Philip B. Stark, ‘‘The Effectiveness of Internet Content Filters” (2008) 4:2 I/S: J.L. &
Policy for Information Society 411 at 422.
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entertainment’” was defined strictly32 and ‘‘[s]ince the indexed portion of the web
contains tens of billions of pages, 1.1% amounts to hundreds of millions of adult
webpages.”33
Amongst this pornography is material which many would undoubtedly find
shocking or disturbing.34 However, prior to the enactment of section 63 of the
Act, there was no legal category of ‘‘extreme pornography.”35 As with the term
‘‘pornography” itself, the concept of ‘‘extreme” pornography is, to some extent,
in the eye of the beholder. Changing attitudes mean that once ‘‘obscene”
depictions may become more ‘‘mainstream.”36 For example, it was estimated
that ‘‘30% of all Canadian newsstand sales in the mid-1980s consisted of
periodicals that would have been illegal 20 years before.”37 Nonetheless, certain
categories of material may generically be described as ‘‘extreme”—as going
beyond the ordinarily accepted limits of even ‘‘hard core” pornography. These
typically fall into three categories: child pornography, sexual violence, 38 and
fetishes and paraphilias such as necrophilia, bestiality, coprophilia, urolagnia,
and fisting.39
32

33
34

35

36

37

38

39

Websites where there is ‘‘sexual content that is clearly adult entertainment, and that
content must be visible without clicking anything”: ibid at 420.
Ibid at 422.
See generally, Ogi Ogas & Sai Gaddam, A Billion Wicked Thoughts: What the Internet
Tells Us about Sexual Relationships (New York: Plume, 2012); Murray Perkins,
‘‘Pornography, Policing and Censorship” in Paul Johnson & Derek Dalton, eds, Policing
Sex (New York: Routledge, 2012) 85 at 90.
In fact, in common with most jurisdictions the term ‘‘pornography” had no legal
meaning, the regulation of such material being governed by the law relating to
‘‘obscenity”: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, ‘‘The Evolution of
Pornography Law in Canada,” by Lyne Casavant & James R. Robertson (Ottawa:
Library of Parliament, 2007) at 2, online: <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/843-e.pdf> [Casavant & Robertson].
Amy Adler, ‘‘All Porn All the Time” (2007) 31:4 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 695 at
701-702. ALRC, Classification, supra note 25 at 28.
Casavant & Robertson, supra note 35 at 2 [emphasis omitted]. It was not that long ago
that obscenity prosecutions were brought in relation to descriptions/depictions of oral
and anal sex: see, e.g., R. v. Anderson (James) (1971), [1972] 1 Q.B. 304 (Eng. C.A.).
However, today proceedings are unlikely to be brought in relation to material depicting
such acts: U.K., Crown Prosecution Service, Obscene Publications, online:
<www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/obscene_publications>.
For example, Coutts was shown to have visited websites such as ‘‘necrobabes”,
‘‘violentpleasure”, ‘‘rapepassion”, ‘‘hangingbitches” and ‘‘deathbyasphyxia”: Coutts,
supra note 9 at 1626. This category may also include violent images placed in a ‘‘sexual
context”: European Parliament, Committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunity, Report on the Consequences of the Sex Industry in the European Union (EP, 2004) at
16, online: <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2004-0274+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>.
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 13; Austl., Commonwealth, Office of
Film and Literature Classification, Guidelines for the Classification of Films and
Computer Games (2005) at 13, online: <https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/
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Concern at the increasing prevalence of violent and degrading pornography
had been expressed for some time,40 including prior to the modern Internet.41
Although one is unlikely to come across extreme pornography by accident, there
is no reason to doubt that such material is indeed ‘‘widely available.” 42 For those
who wish to, it is ‘‘entirely straightforward to access, for free, without giving any
personal details.”43
Given the nature of the material, it is not surprising that data on its
availability is limited. While at the time the offence was proposed there were said
to be ‘‘hundreds of internet sites”44 displaying such material, any assessment
based on the traditional website model does not capture non-website based
material such as peer-to-peer networks or so-called ‘‘darknets.” 45 In any event,
most websites are hosted overseas, with the Internet Watch Foundation
reporting that of the 3,209 reports of allegedly obscene adult content in 2013,
only 7 were assessed as criminally obscene and hosted in the UK.46 Another
possible measure, the number of prosecutions of obscene material, is significantly
influenced by law enforcement priorities. For example, between 1994 and 2003,
as child pornography prosecutions in the UK increased markedly (93 to 1,890),
there was a commensurate decrease in obscenity prosecutions (309 to 39). 47
While child pornography is already subject to a broad range of criminal
offences, including possession,48 other forms of extreme pornography are
typically governed by obscenity laws, if at all. Unless possession of obscene
material generally is to be criminalized, an option which was specifically rejected
in the UK,49 the first challenge is to define the scope of ‘‘extreme.” Under section

40
41

42
43
44
45
46

47

48

F2005L01286>; R. v. Perrin (Stephane Laurent), [2002] EWCA Crim 747 (Eng. C.A.).
For a general discussion of fetishes and paraphilias, see Martin P. Kafka, ‘‘The DSM
Diagnostic Criteria for Fetishism” (2010) 39:2 Archives Sexual Behavior 357.
European Parliament, supra note 38 at 16.
See, e.g., Canada, Pornography and Prostitution in Canada: Report of the Special
Committee on Pornography and Prostitution: Summary (Ottawa: Supply and Services
Canada, 1985) at 23-24, online: <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/
131616NCJRS.pdf> [Fraser Committee Report]; U.S., Department of Justice, Attorney
General’s Commission on Pornography: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1986) at part 2, ch. 5.2, online: <www.porn-report.com/
contents.htm> [U.S., Pornography Commission Report].
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 5.
McGlynn & Rackley, ‘‘Criminalisation,” supra note 23 at 249, n. 28.
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 5.
Edwards, ‘‘Pornography, Censorship and the Internet,” supra note 5 at 630.
Internet Watch Foundation, Annual & Charity Report, 2013 (2013) at 16, online: https://
www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/annual-reports/annual_report_2013.pdf.pdf> [IWF, 2013
Report].
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 6. Similar statistics are found in the US
where between 1992 and 2000 there was a fivefold increase in child pornography
prosecutions while obscenity prosecutions more than halved: Adler, supra note 36 at 701.
See below.
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63 of the Act an extreme pornographic image must depict specific conduct which,
for the purposes of analysis, will be divided into images depicting actual or
threatened harm to a person (Category 1) and images of sexual interference with
corpses or animals (Category 2).50
A Category 1 image is one which:
portrays, in an explicit and realistic way. . .
(a) an act which threatens a person’s life, [or]
(b) an act which results, or which is likely to result, in serious injury to a
person’s anus, breasts, or genitals,
and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any
such person. . .was real.51
A Category 2 image:
portrays, in an explicit and realistic way. . .
(c) an act which involves sexual interference with a human corpse, or
(d) a person performing an act of intercourse or oral sex with an animal
(whether dead or alive),
and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any
such person or animal was real.52

The image53 must be both ‘‘pornographic” and ‘‘extreme,”54 and ‘‘[a]n image
is ‘pornographic’ if it is of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to
have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal.” 55 An
image is ‘‘extreme” if it falls within one of the above categories and is also
‘‘grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character.” 56 A range of
defences apply where, for example, the person had a legitimate reason for being
49

50

51

52
53

54
55

56

Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 11-12. At least in Europe there appears
to be little support more broadly for a general ban on pornography: see, e.g., Zack
Whittaker, ‘‘EU votes to reject ‘porn ban’ proposals,” CNET (12 March 2013), online:
<news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57573771-93/eu-votes-to-reject-porn-ban-proposals>.
The maximum penalty for these offences on indictment is 3 years for Category 1 images
and 2 years for Category 2: CJIA, supra note 20, s. 67.
Ibid, s. 63(7). References to parts of the body include references to surgically constructed
parts, including through gender reassignment surgery: ibid, s. 63(9).
Ibid, s. 63(7).
Defined to mean ‘‘a moving or still image (produced by any means); or. . .data (stored by
any means) which is capable of conversion into [a moving or still image]”: ibid, s. 63(8).
Ibid, s. 63(2).
Ibid, s. 63(3). Where an image forms part of a series of images, whether that image is
pornographic may be determined by reference to ‘‘the image itself,” and ‘‘the context in
which it occurs in the series of images”: ibid, s. 63(4).
Ibid, s. 63(6).
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in possession, or had not requested and was unaware of the nature of the
image.57
Finally, the offence is limited to explicit scenes or realistic depictions.
‘‘Explicit” is intended to mean ‘‘clearly seen and . . . not hidden, disguised or
implied.”58 ‘‘Realistic” scenes are those which ‘‘appear to be real and are
convincing, but which may be acted.”59 This is intended to exclude material such
as text and cartoons,60 but was also seen as necessary to facilitate enforcement by
avoiding the need to prove that the activity actually took place.61
This was not the first time that a proposal had been made to differentiate
forms of obscene material. In Canada, the 1985 Fraser Committee Report into
Pornography had recommended three tiers of obscenity: pornography causing
physical harm, sexually violent and degrading pornography, and visual
pornographic material.62 These were subject to differing restrictions, penalties,
and defences, but none were punishable based on simple possession. Only child
pornography was subject to such sweeping criminalization,63 a measure which
was seen as a serious but necessary step in deterring the further abuse of
children.64 Before considering the rationales used to justify criminalizing the
possession of extreme pornography, it is necessary to review the law governing
obscenity more generally.

II. OBSCENITY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The principal objection to attempts to ban extreme pornography is that such
censorship infringes the right to freedom of expression. 65 As an international
human right, this freedom is contained in article 19 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.66 Although existing at common law,67 it now finds
57

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

66

Ibid, s. 65. In addition, the provision does not apply to ‘‘excluded images” that is, images
which ‘‘form[. . .] part of a series of images contained in a recording of the whole or part of
a classified work”: ibid, ss. 64(1)-(2).
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 11.
Ibid.
The criminalization of cartoons depicting child sexual abuse is discussed below.
See the discussion below.
Fraser Committee Report, supra note 41 at 13, recommendation 7.
Ibid at 45, recommendation 67.
Casavant & Robertson, supra note 35 at 11. This issue is discussed further below.
Also relevant is the right to respect for private and family life: see, e.g., Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 art. 8 (entered into force 3 September 1953) [ECHR]. This issue is discussed further
below.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
art. 19 (entered into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR]. See also Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, Supp. No. 13, U.N. Doc. A/180
(1948), art. 19.
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expression in the UK under article 10 of the ECHR.68 In countries such as
Canada69 and the US,70 it enjoys constitutional protection.71 Of particular
relevance in the digital environment, the right includes the freedom to ‘‘seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media
of his choice.”72
Although fundamental, the right is not absolute. At common law, ‘‘one
proceeds ‘upon an assumption of freedom of speech’ and turns to the law ‘to
discover the established exceptions to it.’”73 At the international level, the right is
subject to ‘‘such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society.”74 That the state may restrict
the availability of ‘‘obscene” material is well-established. The ICCPR itself
provides that the right may be subject to legal restrictions which are necessary
‘‘[f]or the protection of. . .public health or morals.”75 In the European context, it
has been held that the aim of UK obscenity laws—to protect morals in a
democratic society—is a legitimate aim under article 10(2) of the ECHR.76 In
both Canada77 and the US,78 material which is obscene, as opposed to merely
indecent, may fall outside the realms of protected speech.
What constitutes obscene material varies between jurisdictions, but typically
invokes an appeal to community values.79For example, in the United States,
67
68

69

70
71

72
73

74

75
76
77

78
79

Bonnard v. Perryman, [1891] 2 Ch. 269 (Eng. C.A.) at p. 284.
The Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), c. 42, s. 12 incorporates ECHR, supra note 65, art.
10.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Canadian Charter].
U.S. Const. amend I.
Australia has no constitutionally protected freedom of expression other than a limited
right to political expression: Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp. (1997), 189 C.L.R.
520 (Australia H.C.) [Lange]. But note the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities
Act 2006 (Vic), s. 15 [Victorian Charter].
ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 19(2); see also ECHR, supra note 65, art. 10(1).
Lange, supra note 71 at 564, citing Attorney General v. Guardian Newspaper Ltd. (No. 2)
(1988), [1990] 1 A.C. 109 (U.K. H.L.) at p. 283.
ECHR, supra note 65, art. 10(2); see also ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 19(3). Similarly, the
Canadian Charter, supra note 69, s. 1 guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
‘‘subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.” See also Victorian Charter, supra note 71, s. 7.
ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 19(3)(b).
Handyside v. United Kingdom (A/24) (1976), (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 737 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
R. v. Butler, 1992 CarswellMan 100, 1992 CarswellMan 220, EYB 1992-67139, [1992] 1
S.C.R. 452, [1992] S.C.J. No. 14 (S.C.C.), reconsideration / rehearing refused [1993] 2
W.W.R. lxi (S.C.C.) [Butler cited to S.C.R.].
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) at pp. 23-24 [Miller].
The focus of this chapter is on the principle obscenity statutes (see, e.g., Obscene
Publications Act, 1959 (U.K.) 7 & 8 Eliz II, c. 66 [OPA]; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-

POSSESSION OF ‘‘EXTREME’’ PORNOGRAPHY

141

obscene material is material which depicts or describes sexual conduct and which
‘‘taken as a whole, appeal[s] to the prurient interest in sex, which portray[s]
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do[es]
not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 80 In Canada,
material is obscene if its ‘‘dominant characteristic. . .is the undue exploitation of
sex, or of sex and any one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime,
horror, cruelty and violence.”81 The equivalent under Australian law, materials
which are ‘‘refused classification,” are materials that:
[D]escribe, depict, express or otherwise deal with matters of sex, drug
misuse or addiction, crime, cruelty, violence or revolting or abhorrent
phenomena in such a way that they offend against the standards of
morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable
adults to the extent that they should not be classified.82

In contrast, the test of obscenity in the UK looks to the impact on the likely
viewer whereby material is obscene if, taken as a whole, its effect is ‘‘such as to
tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant
circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.”83
In the context of extreme pornography, the issue is not so much whether such
material is obscene. It is at least arguable that the vast majority of material
defined as such could be prosecuted under existing definitions of obscenity. 84
Such material is certainly outside the realm of material which would ordinarily
be viewed in the mainstream media or even in designated ‘‘sex shops.” 85 It is the
decision to punish simple possession of such material that is the most significant
in terms of Internet regulation.
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46, s. 163 [Criminal Code (Can.)]; 18 U.S.C. § 1460-1470) although these are usually
supplemented by related provisions concerned with postal services and customs.
Australia has a cooperative scheme based on the Classification (Publications, Films and
Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth.) with complementary state and territory enforcement
legislation (see, e.g., Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) (Enforcement) Act 1995 (Vic.) [CEA (Vic.)]). Online content is regulated by the Broadcasting
Services Act 1992 (Cth.). There are also some specific state laws: see, e.g., Crimes Act 1900
(N.S.W.), s. 578C; Summary Offences Act 1953 (S.A.), s. 33.
Miller, supra note 78 at 24.
Criminal Code (Can.), supra note 79, s. 163(8).
National Classification Code 2005 (Cth.), s. 2(1)(a) [NCC]. It further includes child
pornography and materials that ‘‘promote, incite or instruct in matters of crime or
violence”: ibid, s. 2(1)(c). See generally, Austl., N.S.W., NSW Parliamentary Library
Research Service, Censorship in Australia: Regulating the Internet and Other Recent
Developments (Briefing Paper No. 4/02) by Gareth Griffith (NSW Parliamentary
Library Research Service, 2002).
OPA, supra note 79, s. 1(1). This is based on the common law test set out in R. v. Hicklin
(1868), (1867-68) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (Eng. Q.B.).
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 5.
Ibid.
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(a) Possessing Obscenity
‘‘[A]dults should be able to read, hear and see what they want.”86

Since the 1970s, most Western countries have moved away from direct
government censorship towards a system of classification which governs the
availability of certain material and informs consumer choice. 87 This is reflected in
restrictions being placed on the production and/or distribution of obscene
material, but not its possession.88 For example, under section 2 of the Obscene
Publications Act 1959 (OPA), while it is an offence to publish an obscene article,
possession is only an offence if it is for the purpose of publication for gain. 89 A
similar approach is taken in Australia,90 Canada,91 and the US,92 and extends to
other forms of restricted material such as hate speech,93 and suicide-related94 and
terrorism-related material.95The central tenet of this approach is the individual’s
right ‘‘to read or observe what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.”96
The issue of possession and freedom of speech was considered, in preInternet days, by the US Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia.97 The State
argued that, as obscene material is not protected speech, the states should be free
to regulate possession of such material to protect their citizens from harm: ‘‘[i]f
the State can protect the body of a citizen, may it not. . .protect his mind?” 98
The Court rejected this argument. Although obscene material did not receive
First Amendment protection, these decisions were made in the context of public
distribution or dissemination of obscene materials. 99 Public distribution of such
material gives rise to other concerns, such that it might ‘‘fall into the hands of
children. . .[or] intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public.” 100
86
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NCC, supra note 82, s. 1(a).
See, e.g., ALRC, Classification, supra note 25 at 49.
Edwards, ‘‘Pornography, Censorship and the Internet,” supra note 5 at 633.
OPA, supra note 79, s. 2(1).
See, e.g., CEA (Vic.), supra note 79.
Criminal Code (Can.), supra note 79, s. 163.
18 U.S.C. § 1460-1470.
Public Order Act 1986 (U.K.), c. 64, Part 3; Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001
(Vic.), ss. 24, 25.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth.), ss. 474.29A, 474.29B [Criminal Code (Austl.); Coroners
and Justice Act 2009 (U.K.), c. 25, s. 61, Schedule 12 [CJA].
Terrorism Act 2006 (U.K.), c. 11, s. 2; Criminal Code (Austl.), supra note 94, s. 101.4.
Stanley, supra note 1 at 565.
Ibid.
Ibid at 560.
Ibid at 560-561, citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959); Jacobellis, supra note 24; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Stanley, supra note 1 at 567.
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It does not follow that a similar interest applies to mere private possession. 101 To
infringe the individual’s fundamental ‘‘right to be free from state inquiry into the
contents of his library”102 requires greater justification than to say that the
material is ‘‘obscene.”103
Similar arguments were made in relation to possession of extreme
pornography:
Whilst many people may find the material morally offensive, this alone
is not sufficient to justify outlawing its possession. Given the
particularly intrusive nature of the proposed offence on an intimate
aspect of an individual’s private life (his or her sexual conduct), weighty
reasons are required to justify prosecuting people for possessing and
viewing these images privately.104

Prior to section 63, the only form of pornography which it was illegal to
possess was child pornography, an example that was specifically drawn upon as
justifying the criminalization of possession of extreme pornography. 105

(b) A Special Case: Child Pornography
It was not until the 1970s that child pornography was regulated separately
from other forms of obscene material.106 Even then, a distinction was often
drawn between simple possession, which was not an offence, and production and
distribution, which were.107 While in the majority of cases child pornography
would also be obscene, the question of whether an image was or was not obscene
‘‘bears no connection to the issue of whether a child has been physically or
psychologically harmed in the production of the work.”108 Accordingly, in the
landmark decision of New York v. Ferber,109 the US Supreme Court held that
child pornography which involves the use of actual children is not
constitutionally protected because the ‘‘prevention of sexual exploitation and
abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing
101
102
103
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Ibid at 568-569.
Ibid at 565.
Ibid.
U.K., Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny, 15th Report (2008) at
para 2.16, online: <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/81/
8105.htm>.
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 8.
Alisdair Gillespie, ‘‘Legal Definitions of Child Pornography” (2010) 16:1 J. Sexual
Aggression 19.
Austl., Commonwealth, Law Reform Commission, Film and Literature Censorship
Procedure (ALRC Report No. 55) (Sydney: Australian Law Reform Commission, 1991)
at 5.16, online: <https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/
ALRC55.pdf>.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) at p. 761 [Ferber].
Ibid.
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importance.”110 Following similar reasoning, most jurisdictions have now
removed the obscenity standard entirely from their child pornography laws
where the sexual activity depicted is ‘‘explicit,”111 ‘‘indecent,”112 ‘‘lascivious”113
or the ‘‘dominant characteristic” is for a ‘‘sexual purpose.” 114
However, this is merely to say that images of child abuse are not protected
speech independently of the test of obscenity. It does not follow that possession
of child pornography must be an offence. In the United States, although the
Child Protection Act of 1984 first removed obscenity requirements following
Ferber,115 it was several years before the Child Protection Restoration and
Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990 penalized simple possession following
Osborne v. Ohio.116 Similarly, simple possession of child pornography was not
an offence in England and Wales until the enactment of section 160 of the
Criminal Justice Act 1988.117 As will be discussed below, the primary rationale
for criminalizing possession was to help stop the market for child pornography
and the abuse of children which underpins it.118 Against this background, we
now turn to consider the arguments used to justify criminalizing the possession of
extreme pornography.

III. CRIMINALIZING POSSESSION OF EXTREME PORNOGRAPHY
[A] prosecution or the threat of a prosecution. . .for looking at adult
pornography in private is a very serious interference in an individual’s
right to respect for an intimate aspect of their private life. . .and their
freedom of expression. . ..Its justification must be stronger than that
required to regulate the publication and distribution of pornography by
commercial operators because the interference in the rights of the
individual are so much more serious.119
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Ibid at 757.
Criminal Code (Can.), supra note 79, s. 163.1(1)(a)(i).
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c. 33, s. 160.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(v).
Criminal Code (Austl.), supra note 94, s. 473.1; Criminal Code (Can.), supra note 79, s.
163.1(1)(a)(ii).
Ferber, supra note 108.
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) [Osborne].
The earlier offence of possession under PCA, supra note 112, s. 1(c) applied only to
possession with intent to distribute. Provisions similar to the 1988 UK act are found in
other jurisdictions: Criminal Code (Can.), supra note 79, s. 163.1(4); Crimes Act 1958
(Vic.), s. 70 [Crimes Act (Vic.)].
See the discussion below.
Rabinder Singh, ‘‘In the Matter of the Consultation Paper on the Possession of Extreme
Pornographic Material,” Backlash (18 November 2005) at para 29, online: <www.backlash-uk.org.uk/wp/?page_id=148>.
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An offence of possession of extreme pornography impacts a broad range of
interests including:
[F]reedom of speech, protection of the vulnerable, the impact of the
Internet on the consumption of violent pornography and wider moral
questions about whether some material is so violent, degrading and
potentially harmful that its possession should be controlled.120

It therefore requires a range of justifications. To some extent these were
reminiscent of the so-called ‘‘‘porn wars’” of the 80s and 90s, with the
‘‘triangulated” clash of ‘‘three competing fundamentalisms, the moral
conservative, the radical feminist, and the classical liberal.” 121 However a new
addition to the debate, and a direct result of new technology, was the concern
that existing obscenity laws could not be enforced.
In broad terms, the government offered three rationales. First, to ‘‘protect
those who participate in the creation of sexual material containing violence,
cruelty or degradation.”122 Second, ‘‘to protect society, particularly children,
from exposure to such material.”123 Third, the difficulty of enforcing existing
restrictions on obscene material.124

(a) Protecting the Vulnerable
The clearest response to libertarian objections to an offence of possession is
to demonstrate the harm caused by the proscribed conduct.125 Unfortunately,
demonstrating the harm caused by possessing extreme pornography is far from
straightforward. Such harm may be direct or indirect.126 ‘‘Direct harm” refers to
harm to ‘‘those who participate in the creation of sexual material containing
violence, cruelty or degradation, who may be the victims of crime in the making
of the material.”127 ‘‘Indirect harm” refers to the negative impact such material
may have, not on the participants, but on the viewer.128

(i) Direct Harm
To the extent that extreme pornography depicts unlawful harm, it may be
argued that it should be banned in order to protect those who are involved in its
120
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Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 5.
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J.L. & Soc’y 327 at 328.
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Ibid.
Ibid.
‘‘That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”: John Stuart Mill, On
Liberty (London, U.K.: J.W. Parker & Son, 1959) at 22.
Murray, supra note 17 at 75-78.
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 11.
Ibid at 8.
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production.129 As discussed above, such arguments were accepted as denying
child pornography the status of protected speech, and similar arguments may be
made in the context of extreme pornography. However, to say that such material
may be restricted does not tell us why it should not be possessed. While those
participating in the original offence should be prosecuted, and further
distribution may be restricted, punishing the person who views a record of
that offence does nothing to prevent the harm already caused to the person
depicted in the image. It may nonetheless help to prevent future harm in two
ways.
First, criminalizing possession can help to address the harm to victims that
may result from the ‘‘continued circulation of images of their abuse.” 130 As was
stated in the context of child pornography, the materials produced are a
permanent record of the abuse of that child, and ‘‘the harm to the child is
exacerbated by their circulation.”131 An offence of possession may therefore
encourage the possessor to destroy such images.132
Second, and more powerfully, criminalizing possession may stem the market
for such material, which will in turn help to prevent future harm to those who
may participate in its production.133 This rationale is widely accepted as
justifying the criminalization of possession of child pornography:
Production of child pornography is fueled by the market for it, and the
market in turn is fueled by those who seek to possess it. Criminalizing
possession may reduce the market for child pornography and the abuse
of children it often involves.134

This rationale is particularly significant in the online environment where
material may easily be accessed from anywhere in the world. It is therefore
argued that criminalizing possession of such images may help break the
‘‘demand/supply/demand cycle.”135
In the context of extreme pornography, this rationale is most clearly reflected
in Category 1 material where the image depicts actual as opposed to simulated
harm. This is the most persuasive argument based on direct harm, with even
129
130
131

132
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Ibid at 10.
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Ferber, supra note 108 at 759. See also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
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Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 8.
R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, 2001 CarswellBC 82, 2001 CarswellBC 83, REJB 2001-22168,
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3 (S.C.C.) at para. 92 [Sharpe]. See also Osborne,
supra note 116 at 109-110; R. v. Land (Michael) (1997), [1999] Q.B. 65 (Eng. C.A.) at p.
70; R. v. Coffey, [2003] VSCA 155, 6 V.R. 543 (Vic. S.C.) at p. 552. Maxwell Taylor &
Ethel Quayle, Child Pornography: An Internet Crime (Hove, U.K.: Brunner-Routledge,
2003) at 23-26; Gillespie, Law & Policy, supra note 8 at 33-34, 37-38.
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 9.
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those generally opposed to the provisions accepting that it would be defensible to
target material which involved non-consensual physical harm.136 However, the
force of this argument is weakened by the broad scope of the provision, which
manages both to incorporate material which is not harmful and exclude material
that is.
First, the relevant conduct must be life threatening or involve injury to the
breasts, anus (not buttocks), or genitals. It therefore requires a higher level of
violence than the physical aggression which is increasingly common in popular
pornography.137 However, the provision also extends beyond actual harm to
include the ‘‘likely” infliction of serious injury. Therefore, images of actual
physical harm other than to the designated areas would be permissible.
Conversely, images of consensual conduct which does not cause harm would
nonetheless be prohibited if ‘‘likely” to cause serious injury. The challenges in
applying this provision are well-illustrated by a case in which the defendant was
acquitted in respect of images of anal fisting and urethral sounding, 138 the
defence having argued that the images did not depict conduct which would or
was likely to result in serious injury.139
Further, the provision extends to ‘‘explicit and realistic” depictions of harm.
This brings within the provision conduct which may be simulated and/or
consensual such as consensual sadomasochistic activity,140 or websites featuring
‘‘staged scenes performed by consenting actors.”141
The government also referred to the fact that participants may be the victims
of crime, ‘‘whether or not they notionally or genuinely consent to taking part.” 142
136
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138

139

140
141

Backlash, ‘‘‘Extreme’ Pornography Proposals: Ill-Conceived and Wrong” in Clare
McGlynn, Erika Rackley & Nicole Westmarland, eds, Positions on the Politics of Porn: A
Debate on Government Plans to Criminalise the Possession of Extreme Pornography
(Durham, U.K.: Durham University, 2007) 9 at 13.
Mark Huppin & Neil Malamuth, ‘‘The Obscenity Conundrum, Contingent Harms, and
Constitutional Consistency” (2012) 23:1 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev 31 at 80. See generally Ana
J. Bridges, Robert Wosnitzer, Erica Scharrer, Chyng Sun & Rachael Liberman,
‘‘Aggression and Sexual Behavior in Best-Selling Pornography Videos: A Content
Analysis Update” (2010) 16:10 Violence against Women 1065.
Urethral sounding is ‘‘[w]here medical rods are inserted into the urethra in order to
stimulate the prostate for sexual pleasure”: Erika Rackley & Clare McGlynn,
‘‘Prosecuting the Possession of Extreme Pornography: A Misunderstood and Misused
Law” (2013) 5 Crim. L. Rev. 400 at 403, n. 10.
Caroline Davies, ‘‘Former Boris Johnson aide cleared of possession of ‘extreme
pornography,’” The Guardian (8 August 2012), online: <www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/
aug/08/boris-johnson-aide-extreme-pornography-cleared>. Of course, the jury’s reasons for acquitting ‘‘‘can be no more than conjecture’”: Rackley & McGlynn, supra note
138 at 402, citing correspondence with the trial judge in R. v. Walsh (August 8, 2010),
Kingston (Crown Ct.).
Backlash, supra note 136 at 10-12.
Ibid at 10. See also Avedon Carol & Feminists against Censorship, ‘‘Reflections on the
Positions on the Politics of Pornography Conference” in McGlynn, Rackley &
Westmarland, supra note 136, 15.
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The notion of consent is therefore dismissed,143 notwithstanding the law allows
for a certain level of consensual harm.144 Although a defence was belatedly
added where the defendant directly participated in conduct which did not involve
the infliction of non-consensual harm,145 this does not assist the non-participant
who wishes to watch material which is consensual.
Second, the requirement that the material be ‘‘pornographic” significantly
limits the application of the provision. Although intended to ensure that the
provision did not apply to, for example, news or documentary footage, 146 it
ensures that material depicting extreme violence without sexual overtones must
be prosecuted, if at all, under obscenity laws and therefore be lawful to
possess.147
There are numerous examples of non-pornographic material which is
produced for distribution on the Internet where actual harm, including death,
is caused to participants. For example, terrorist images of torture and beheadings
as well as the perversely termed ‘‘happy slapping”148—that is, the visual
recording of criminal acts ‘‘ranging from basic intimidation, robbery and beating
to rape and murder.”149 Such material provides a much more direct link between
physical harm to victims and the demand for such material to be filmed and
distributed. In contrast to most of the material currently covered by the
provision, it is also arguably more likely to encourage the commission of criminal
offences within the jurisdiction.
It may therefore be argued that the direct harm rationale should extend to
criminalize the possession of images of extreme violence, subject to defences,
regardless of whether they were produced for a sexual purpose. While obscenity
laws are commonly linked with depictions of sex,150 it is not necessarily the
case.151 For example, the categories of material that may be ‘‘refused
classification” under Australian law include materials that ‘‘describe, depict,
express or otherwise deal with matters of. . .crime, cruelty, [or] violence.” 152 In
142
143
144

145

146
147
148

149
150
151
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the context of children, in addition to child pornography, Australian federal law
extends to ‘‘child abuse material”—that is, material in which a child is tortured
or subject to cruelty or physical abuse.153
The argument in relation to direct harm is arguably more tenuous in the
context of Category 2 material. In the case of animals, not only does sexual
interference not necessarily cause physical harm to an animal, non-sexual animal
cruelty is excluded because of the requirement that it be pornographic.
Therefore, while videos of bear baiting, cock fighting, and other examples of
animal cruelty are readily available, possession of images of sexual interference
with an animal is an offence.154 Similarly, in the case of corpses, images of
desecration may be possessed, so long as they are not produced for a sexual
purpose.
Although bestiality and necrophilia are illegal in the UK155 and many other
countries,156 that fact alone cannot justify an offence of possession. Otherwise,
the argument could be made to criminalize the possession of images depicting a
range of unlawful conduct. In addition, the definitions of extreme pornography
are in some instances broader than the corresponding offence. For example,
while sexual penetration of a corpse is illegal under section 70 of the Sexual
Offences Act 2003, sexual interference with a corpse more broadly is not.
Similarly, while sexual intercourse with an animal is illegal, oral intercourse is
not.157 This gives rise to the situation that it would be an offence to possess an
image of lawful conduct. Of course, given that most of the material is sourced
from overseas, it may be impossible to know whether it depicts conduct which is
lawful in the jurisdiction in which it was produced.

(ii) Indirect Harm
An additional justification for criminalizing possession is the possibility that
‘‘such material may encourage or reinforce interest in violent and aberrant sexual
activity to the detriment of society as a whole.”158 Although such arguments may
be made in relation to images of actual harm, they assume particular significance
in relation to ‘‘explicit and realistic” depictions of harm, as in such cases the
rationale for criminalizing possession lies not in the harm caused to participants,
but in the impact such material may have on the viewer. This justification was
152
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also used in relation to child pornography, producing divergent responses from
the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States.
In R. v. Sharpe,159 the Supreme Court of Canada referred to several studies
which suggested that child pornography may fuel fantasies and provoke certain
people to offend.160 Although acknowledging that the evidence was ‘‘not
strong,”161 it was accepted that child pornography may promote cognitive
distortions such that it may normalize sexual activity with children in the mind of
the possessor, weakening inhibitions and potentially leading to actual abuse. 162
The Court further held that this rationale could apply equally to material where
no child was involved in its production163e.g., ‘‘pseudo pornography,” which
involves digitally manipulated images of real people, and ‘‘virtual pornography,”
which includes computer generated images, cartoons, and the like.164 Such
material could also promote cognitive distortions in the viewer, potentially
leading to child abuse, or be used to groom children for sexual activity. 165
Banning such materials was therefore in accordance with Parliament’s intention
to criminalize the possession of material that ‘‘poses a reasoned risk of harm to
children.”166
Similar arguments were also used in the UK to justify an offence of
possessing a ‘‘prohibited image of a child,”167 which includes ‘‘non-photographic
visual depictions of child sexual abuse,” including cartoons. 168 While it was
acknowledged that there was no specific research looking at a direct link between
possession of such material and the sexual abuse of children, 169 there was
concern that such material might ‘‘fuel abuse of real children by reinforcing
potential abusers’ inappropriate feelings towards children.” 170
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(Telecommunications Offences and other Measures) Bill (No. 2), 2002-2004 Sess.,
2004, Explanatory Memorandum at 6, online: <parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/down-
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In contrast, the US Supreme Court struck down the relevant federal
provision to the extent that it applied to material which was not obscene, and
which did not involve the abuse of children in its production: ‘‘the causal link is
contingent and indirect. The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech,
but depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts.” 171
Further, the fact that such material may ‘‘whet the appetite of child
molesters,”172 and encourage them to engage in offending behaviour is not
sufficient. Speech may be restricted if it is ‘‘‘directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.’” 173 In this
case, the government had shown ‘‘no more than a remote connection between
speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child
abuse.”174
In the context of extreme pornography, the difficulty lies not so much in the
rationale, but in the evidence that supports it. In Stanley, the Court rejected the
State’s argument that exposure to obscene material may lead to deviant sexual
behaviour or crimes of sexual violence,175 finding that ‘‘[t]here appears to be little
empirical basis for that assertion.”176
Even in the case of child pornography, the impact of viewing on the risk of
contact offending is complex and unresolved.177 Despite numerous studies into
the effects of adult pornography,178 its impact on behaviour remains a hotly
contested issue.179 Far from offering new evidence in support of this argument,
the government simply acknowledged that no definite conclusions could be
drawn as to the likely long term impact of extreme pornography on behaviour. 180
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It was only after the Bill was introduced that a Rapid Evidence
Assessment181 was provided.182 The REA, which was based on five metaanalyses and 32 additional studies,183 concluded that the existing research
‘‘supports the existence of some harmful effects from extreme pornography on
some who access it. These included increased risk of developing pro-rape
attitudes, beliefs and behaviours, and committing sexual offences.” 184 While it
was acknowledged that this was also true of non-extreme pornography, ‘‘it
showed that the effects of extreme pornography were more serious.”185 Further,
it concluded that ‘‘[m]en who are predisposed to aggression, or have a history of
sexual and other aggression were more susceptible to the influence of extreme
pornographic material.”186
The government’s REA was strongly criticized.187 Not only were the
assessors ‘‘known for their anti-pornography views,”188 one was the author of
some of the research papers relied upon.189 More fundamentally, it was argued
that the study did not address the limitations of ‘‘effects research” in determining
a causal connection between viewing certain material and violent behaviour. 190
Much of the research on which the assessment was based was carried out prior to
the advent of the Internet,191 and broad assumptions were made that the material
utilized in previous studies fell within the legislative definition of ‘‘extreme
pornographic material.”192 No mention was made of simulated material and its
180
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impact on viewers’ attitudes. ‘‘A possession offence based on outdated research
methods analysing data in other jurisdictions and only concluding that some
negative impact may be had on some viewers does not amount to evidence-based
policy making.”193
An alternative view is that the question of whether pornography ‘‘causes”
sexual violence is ‘‘an unanswerable distraction” that ‘‘assumes a deterministic
model of human nature,” when in reality ‘‘there are complex links between
pornography and violence against women and children.”194 Such material is said
to cause ‘‘cultural harm,”195 thus avoiding the need to prove direct harm and
focusing instead on the indirect harm that pornography may cause in relation to
attitudes of equal worth and equal protection.196 Such language was echoed in
the government’s proposal,197 and has been recognized in the US198 and
Canada.199 As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. Butler:
The effect of this type of material is to reinforce male-female
stereotypes to the detriment of both sexes. It attempts to make
degradation, humiliation, victimization, and violence in human relationships appear normal and acceptable. A society which holds that
egalitarianism, non-violence, consensualism, and mutuality are basic to
any human interaction, whether sexual or other, is clearly justified in
controlling and prohibiting any medium of depiction, description or
advocacy which violates these principles.200

For example, in Butler it was held that the ‘‘overriding objective of [the
obscenity provision] is not moral disapprobation but the avoidance of harm to
society.”201 Although acknowledging that ‘‘a direct link between obscenity and
harm to society may be difficult to establish,”202 the criminalization of such
material ‘‘demonstrates our community’s disapproval of the dissemination of
materials which potentially victimize women and restricts the negative influence
which such materials have on changes in attitudes and behaviour.”203 Further, in
the context of material which is degrading or dehumanizing, ‘‘the appearance of
193
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consent is not necessarily determinative. . ..Sometimes the very appearance of
consent makes the depicted acts even more degrading or dehumanizing.”204
It is notable, however, that in no jurisdiction other than the United Kingdom
has the view been taken that this would justify the criminalization of possession
of such material. Because the harm arises from members of the public being
exposed to such material, ‘‘[t]his type of harm can arise only if members of the
public may be exposed to the conduct or material in question.” 205 Even in
Canada, where such harm is explicitly recognized, the proposed prohibition only
applied to public distribution and exhibition.206
While some argued that the government’s language may, at times, have had
something in common with a ‘‘radical feminist perspective,”207 the final form of
the legislation ‘‘eschewed any vaguely ‘feminist’ idea that regulating
pornography was part of a programme to achieve equality for women.” 208 The
difficulty for the government was that in the absence of a blanket ban on
pornography, it was necessary to define the ‘‘‘wrong’” form of pornography, 209
thus highlighting the difficulty in identifying material which causes cultural harm
and that which does not. For example, images must depict acts that are life
threatening or which result in, or are likely to result in, serious injury to a
person’s anus, breasts, or genitals. Therefore, it does not encompass images of
rape that do not meet these criteria. Paradoxically, this meant that the legislation
would most likely not extend to many of the pro-rape websites which were part
of the initial impetus for the legislation. 210 This may be contrasted with the
equivalent Scottish provision, which extends to ‘‘explicit and realistic” depictions
of ‘‘rape or other non-consensual penetrative sexual activity.” 211
This situation changed with the commencement of the Criminal Justice and
Courts Act 2015,212 section 37 of which inserted a new section 63(7A) into the
204
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208
209
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CJIA. This section, which commenced operation on 13 April 2015, 213 applies
only to England and Wales214 and extends the definition of ‘‘extreme image” to
include an image which portrays either:
(a) an act which involves the non-consensual penetration of a person’s vagina,
anus or mouth by another with the other person’s penis, or
(b) an act which involves the non-consensual sexual penetration of a person’s
vagina or anus by another with a part of the other person’s body or
anything else,
and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that the persons
were real.
The depiction must, however, be ‘‘explicit and realistic.” Therefore, some
depictions of rape may continue to fall outside the legislation. For example, one
of the sites viewed by Coutts, ‘‘Necrobabes,” apparently depicts the murder of
women by men, ‘‘clearly and not especially realistically, staged in a studio
setting.”215

(b) Legal Moralism
We are targeting that material not on account of offences which may or
may not have been committed in the production of the material, but
because the material itself, which depicts extreme violence and often
appears to be non-consensual, is to be deplored.216

With an acknowledgement that such material should be banned regardless of
harm, the government moved to arguments based in repugnance and the
protection of social values.217 Certainly, language such as ‘‘‘abhorrent,’
‘degrading’ and ‘repugnant’”218 brought an ‘‘openly moral quality”219 to
debates about material that ‘‘should have no place in our society.”220 In legal
terms, this is most clearly reflected in the incorporation of an obscenity
standard—that is, the image possessed must be ‘‘grossly offensive, disgusting or
213
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215
216
217
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otherwise of an obscene character.”221 By linking the offence to notions of
obscenity, the government therefore moved towards a moralistic rationale, based
in notions of disgust, rather than one based in harm.222
Such a requirement was not included in the original proposal, but was added
during the final stages of the parliamentary process,223 apparently to ensure that
the new provision would not criminalize the possession of material which it
would be lawful to publish under the OPA.224 It was not, however, intended to
‘‘import the language of or build directly on the Obscene Publications Act” 225
because there would be ‘‘difficulties in squaring the purpose of the OPA with a
simple possession offence.”226
This may initially seem a strange argument, given that one of the objectives
of the OPA is ‘‘to strengthen the law concerning pornography.”227 Surely it
would be more consistent to simply ban the possession of all obscene material,
particularly as the government’s own research indicated that non-extreme
pornography also produced harmful effects, though to a less serious degree. 228
However, concern about alignment with the OPA pre-dated the insertion of an
obscenity requirement. At that time, it arguably made sense to restrict the offence
of possession only to extreme pornography, given that the OPA covered a much
broader range of material.229
Apparently based on the ordinary dictionary definition of ‘‘obscene,” 230 the
terms ‘‘grossly offensive” and ‘‘disgusting” were to be understood as examples of
obscenity, rather than alternatives. Their addition did, nonetheless, create a test
which is broader in scope than the tendency ‘‘to deprave and corrupt” standard
found in the OPA.231 Rather than focusing solely on the impact on those likely to
see the material, it is sufficient that the material is ‘‘grossly offensive” or
‘‘disgusting” according to the standards of the ‘‘‘average’” or ‘‘‘reasonable’”
person.232 The difference in emphasis may be illustrated by the case of Michael
Peacock who was acquitted of six counts under the OPA in respect of images of
lawful sexual conduct including urination, anal fisting, staged kidnapping and
rape and sado-masochistic practices.233 While jurors apparently were not
221
222
223
224
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satisfied that the material was obscene, it is conceivable that a jury might
nonetheless find such material ‘‘grossly offensive or disgusting.”
The fact that the material must be grossly offensive or disgusting suggests
that it is directed at ‘‘offence to others.”234 Applying the ‘‘offense principle,” such
conduct may arguably be criminalized where it ‘‘would probably be an effective
way of preventing serious offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other
than the actor, and that it is probably a necessary means to that end.” 235
However, even if it were accepted that some extreme pornography might cause
‘‘profound offense,”236 the offence of possession relates only to the defendant.
Given that the offence principle is directed towards ‘‘offending which violates the
rights of those who are offended,”237 if the person in possession is not offended,
then where is the harm? As the government itself acknowledged: ‘‘[t]he primary
purpose of the obscenity Acts is to tackle the spread of the material and the
possible corruption of individuals by it. That is why we do not penalise simple
possession.”238
By seeking to criminalize a private act, the offence lacks the sense of being a
‘‘public” wrong generally seen as necessary to justify criminalization.239 It is an
illustration of what Feinberg terms ‘‘bare knowledge”—that is, ‘‘[t]he offended
party experiences moral shock, revulsion, and indignation, not on his own behalf
. . .but on behalf of his moral principles.”240 Such an offence is not justified on a
liberal offence principle since that principle requires the conduct to be a violation
of the offended party’s rights.241 As repulsive as extreme pornography may be,
‘‘even the offended party himself will not claim that his own rights have been
necessarily violated by any unobserved conduct that he thinks of as morally
odious.”242
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Further, criminal offences based on the ‘‘[o]ffence [p]rinciple” are inherently
communicative in nature.243 As von Hirsch and Simester stated, ‘‘[t]he reason for
not criminalising ‘offensive’ conduct that is wholly segregated from public view is
not that it is avoidable, but that, since offence is a communicative wrong, there is
no wrongdoing.”244 In the case of a possession offence, the relevant conduct is
not that which is depicted in the images—it is the fact that the defendant is in
possession of such images (ironically, a fact which would ordinarily be unknown
unless the person is charged). If possession is to be seen as offensive, it must be
on the basis that it violates a relevant standard245 or is in itself wrongful and
therefore deserving of censure.246 However, as possession occurs in private it
does not intrude upon the rights of others.247 It is not even that people do not
like the conduct—which they do not observe—it is that they do not like the idea
of the conduct. If ‘‘I don’t like it” is never a sufficient justification for
criminalization,248 then surely ‘‘I don’t like the idea of it” is even closer to Hart’s
assertion that ‘‘attribution of value to mere conforming behaviour. . .belongs not
to morality but to taboo.”249
Some advocate, along the lines of Devlin, that ‘‘disgust” is an appropriate
measure of whether the private possession of certain images is harmful to the
moral values of society.250 Apart from obvious objections as to inconsistent
responses from jurors, and whether jurors can in fact be said to reflect broader
notions of social morality,251 this is not the question the legislation asks. It
merely asks jurors whether the image is grossly offensive or disgusting. If it is,
then assuming the other requirements are satisfied, its private possession is
presumed to be ‘‘so threatening to society that it is worth turning people into
criminals and sending them to jail.”252
If moral harm were indeed the target of the offence, the question for the jury
could more appropriately be phrased as a variation on the earlier Canadian
‘‘community standards” test which was concerned ‘‘not with what Canadians
would not tolerate being exposed to themselves, but what they would not tolerate
other Canadians being exposed to.”253 That is, jurors could be asked whether the
243
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material is so grossly offensive or disgusting that it should not be possessed in
private by anyone. This would make the moral assessment explicit, rather than
implicit in notions of offence or disgust.
Further, by only banning possession of certain obscene material, it is implicit
that people have a right to possess obscene material which would fall under the
OPA, but not section 63. That is, some material is more obscene than others.
Once arguments based in harm are found wanting, it is difficult to see why or
how a coherent distinction should be drawn between some material which is
grossly offensive or disgusting and others. For example, a person may be jailed
for possession of images of bestiality,254 but not ‘‘activities involving perversion
or degradation (such as drinking urine, urination or vomiting on to the body, or
excretion or use of excreta).”255 Both may be obscene, pornographic, degrading
and repugnant, but only one is totally banned.256
If such reactions are to be the basis of a criminal offence, then it must be on
the basis of ‘‘legal moralism which enforces moral conviction and gives effect to
moral outrage even when there are no violated rights, and in general no persons
to ‘protect.’”257 Such a view is not only directly contrary to the liberal view that
the harm principle must relate to harm to others,258 it also takes the moral harm
argument to the extreme position that ‘‘criminalisation is necessary on the
ground that an individual should be prevented from depraving and corrupting
himself.”259 While it is clearly accepted that ‘‘offence” may be a legitimate basis
for restricting the publication or distribution of material, prior to section 63 it
had never been regarded as a sufficient basis for criminalizing possession. 260 As
253
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stated by the US Supreme Court: ‘‘[w]hatever the power of the state to control
public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s
private thoughts.”261

(c) Facilitating Enforcement
‘‘We . . . require the individual to take greater responsibility if we are to
maintain our controls on illegal material.”262

The rationale which differentiates this from previous debates is the role of the
Internet whereby ‘‘access can no longer be reliably controlled through legislation
dealing with publication and distribution.”263 Historically, greater restrictions
have been placed on media which is seen as more public, such as films and
television, compared to the more private such as books and magazines. 264
Convergence has blurred that distinction,265 and the relatively strict demarcation
between possessor and producer/publisher no longer applies.266 The question
then arises whether:
[I]t is ethically ‘‘better”, or practically more efficient, in terms of
maintaining the balance between free speech and protection of the
public, for the state to turn its enforcement efforts towards those who
originate potentially harmful content (authors); those who read or
access it (Internet users); or those who participate in publishing and
distributing it (ISPs, hosts, aggregators and search engines).267

In seeking to limit or at least regulate online content, a range of measures
may be taken including content warnings, age-verification systems, take-down
notices, ISP filtering, or search engine restrictions. 268 Certainly in the UK such
an approach appears to be quite successful in limiting the amount of material
hosted locally.269 For example, ‘‘the proportion of child sexual abuse content . . .
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hosted in the UK has reduced from 18% in 1997 [(the year after the IWF
commenced operations)] to less than 1% since 2003.”270
However, such measures are often of limited effectiveness and politically very
difficult to implement.271 They do not capture material distributed via peer-topeer networks and the like, and can generally be easily circumvented.272 As most
originators, and many intermediaries, remain outside the jurisdiction, these
measures have limited impact on the accessibility of such material. An offence of
possession was therefore employed because existing means of control were
ineffective, shifting the focus of criminal liability from producer/distributor to
consumer.273 In essence, the sanctity of a person’s ‘‘library” is only respected to
the extent that we can control what he or she puts in that library.
Such arguments have been raised before. In Stanley, the Court rejected the
argument that it is necessary to prosecute possession of obscene materials
because of difficulties associated with proving distribution or an intention to
distribute.274 Even were such difficulties to exist, freedom of expression is so
fundamental that ‘‘its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the
administration of otherwise valid criminal laws.”275 This may be contrasted with
child pornography where the need to stem the market for material depicting
actual child abuse was the sort of compelling reason,276 which could be used to
justify criminalizing mere possession.277
Similarly, in Sharpe it was argued that prohibiting the possession of child
pornography assists law enforcement efforts to reduce the production,
distribution, and use of child pornography that result in direct harm to
children.278 Although a ‘‘positive side-effect of the law,”279 this rationale could
not be the sole justification for abridging a Charter right.280
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A related argument is that it is necessary to include depictions of harm as
being ‘‘in part necessary to avoid the need to prove the activity actually took
place, as this would be an insuperable hurdle for the prosecution, particularly if
the material comes from abroad.”281 Such an argument was rejected by the US
Supreme Court in relation to virtual child pornography as it effectively ‘‘turns
the First Amendment upside down” by arguing that protected speech may be
banned as a means to ban unprotected speech.282
If the concern is that the possessor may distribute the material, this would to
be to punish a ‘‘remote harm” in that it depends upon a future decision to
distribute the material.283 It is surely preferable to utilize existing offences to
punish the act of distribution, rather than punish all possession in the
anticipation that some material may be distributed. As a general principle,
conduct which is not of itself harmful should not be criminalized ‘‘unless it is
accompanied by an intention to encourage, assist, or commit a substantive
offence.”284
Apart from the philosophical, such an approach faces practical objections. In
particular, any attempt to limit the market in extreme pornography is likely to
fail without international agreement. The analogy with child pornography
provides a stark contrast, its criminalization being supported by international
agreement285 and international cooperation.286 However, even in the case of
child pornography, differences arise between jurisdictions. For example, under
the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime,287 parties can reserve the
right not to punish simple possession, may elect the relevant age to be as low 16,
279
280
281
282
283

284

285

286

287

Ibid at para 90.
Ibid at para 90; see also Taylor & Quayle, supra note 134 at 24-26.
Home Office & Scottish Executive, supra note 7 at 11.
Ashcroft, supra note 131 at 255.
Andrew von Hirsch, ‘‘Extending the Harm Principle: ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair
Imputation” in A.P. Simester and A.T.H Smith, eds, Harm and Culpability (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1996) 259 at 263-264.
Andrew Ashworth & Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law, 7th ed (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009) at 39.
See, e.g., the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 25 May 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227
(entered into force 18 January 2002); E.C., Directive 2011/92/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2004/68/JHA. [2011] O.J., L 335.
See, e.g., the Virtual Global Taskforce and Interpol: Virtual Global Taskforce, ‘‘What
We Do,” online: <www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com>; INTERPOL, ‘‘Crimes against
Children,” online: <www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Crimes-against-children/Crimesagainst-children2>.
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November
2001, 2001 C.E.T.S. 185, art. 25(1), online: <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/
Html/185.htm> [Convention on Cybercrime].

POSSESSION OF ‘‘EXTREME’’ PORNOGRAPHY

163

and can choose not to apply the offence to realistic depictions of children. 288 The
difficulty in securing international agreement on such issues is illustrated by the
fact that child pornography is the only content-related offence contained within
the Convention on Cybercrime.289 In contrast, issues of ‘‘hate speech” are
addressed in an Additional Protocol to the Convention. 290
Given the broad range of material covered by the term ‘‘extreme
pornography,” there is little prospect of achieving an effective international
agreement.291 Without such agreement, there is little prospect of effective
international cooperation.292 Even if the production/distribution of such
material is banned in other countries, in most other countries its possession
will be lawful.293 It is not clear that extreme pornography will see the same level
of prosecutorial attention as child pornography.294 Those prosecutions that do
occur may be where the material is found inadvertently, 295 or in connection with
child pornography296 or other offending against children.297 In the United States,
between 2000 and 2005 there were fewer than 20 prosecutions for obscenity
which did not involve child pornography or other charges concerning minors. 298
Although the prosecution of obscenity laws may be receiving greater
attention,299 this is typically in the context of distribution, not possession. In
contrast, early prosecution statistics in the UK showed 1,165 possession offences
charged and reaching first hearing in the Magistrates’ Court for the year 2010-
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2011.300 Predictions that the number of prosecutions would be few may have
been misplaced.301

IV. AN INTERNET SPECIFIC CRIME? POSSESSION VERSUS
PROCURING
Far from being the first step in a concerted effort to stem the worldwide trade
in extreme pornography, section 63 of the Act was an effort to enforce obscenity
laws which had become unenforceable due to technological change. If the
Internet provides the circumstances in which such an offence is necessary, it may
be asked: why should such an offence not be limited to the online environment?
In general terms, regulation should ideally be technologically neutral—i.e.,
relating to content, not platform.302 Further, there is often said to be a general
‘‘principle” of ‘‘online/offline consistency”—that is, so far as possible, conduct
which is criminal offline should also be criminal online. If conduct is not criminal
offline, it should not be criminalized online without clear justification. 303
However, such principles are not absolute, and in some circumstances distinct
regulation of the online environment may be justifiable. In this context,
‘‘consistency” is more about consistency of outcome than purpose. 304
‘‘According to this logic, content regulation ought to be crafted to increase the
extent to which it is equally difficult to access illegal or restricted content
whatever medium is employed.”305 It may therefore be necessary to ‘‘treat
different technologies differently” in order to achieve similar outcomes. 306
In the context of extreme pornography, it was simply stated, without
elaboration, that the offence would equally apply to offline material. 307
Therefore conduct which had not been an offence offline was to be
criminalized in order that online conduct could be criminalized. While it is
clearly possible to be prosecuted for possession of a digital file, concepts of
300
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possession developed largely in relation to tangible items such as drugs and
firearms.308 The application of such principles to intangible data may give rise to
complications which unnecessarily hamper prosecutions—for example,
possession of deleted files,309 the defendant’s knowledge of the existence of the
file,310 and questions of whether viewing an image online can constitute
possession.311
More fundamentally, it is arguable that the term ‘‘possession” does not
adequately describe the conduct which is sought to be punished. Unless selfproduced, an image is not possessed unless it has been acquired. It is this which
creates the market for abuse material which is ‘‘fueled by those who seek to
possess it.”312 As the vast majority of extreme pornography is sourced from
outside the jurisdiction, such an offence may be seen as analogous to
importation.313 While the concept of importation can be applied to digital
content,314 more modern provisions may be employed to criminalize the
importation of prohibited digital material into the jurisdiction.
In the context of child pornography, such conduct falls under the heading of
‘‘procuring,” which is intended to encompass a person who actively obtains child
pornography—for example, by downloading it, whether for himself or
another.315 As with other offences, the rationale for punishing the act of
procuring is that it increases market demand for child pornography. 316 Courts in
the United States have clearly rejected any suggestion that procuring offences
should not apply where the material is received only for ‘‘personal use.” 317
Accordingly, in the context of child pornography, a number of jurisdictions have
enacted specific offences of ‘‘accessing.”318
308

309
310
311

312
313

314

315

316

317

318

See generally Jonathan Clough, ‘‘Now You See it, Now You Don’t: Digital Images and
the Meaning of ‘Possession’” (2008) 19:2 Crim. L.F. 205.
R. v. Porter (Ross Warwick) (2006), [2007] 2 All E.R. 625 (Eng. C.A.).
Atkins v. DPP, [2000] 2 All E.R. 425 (D.C.).
R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, 2010 CarswellSask 150, 2010 CarswellSask 151, [2010] 1
S.C.R. 253, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8 (S.C.C.) [Morelli].
Sharpe, supra note 134 at para 92.
See Customs Consolidation Act, 1876 (U.K.), 39 & 40 Vict I, c. 36, s. 42; Customs Act 1901
(Cth.), Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 (Cth.), s. 4a; Canada, Customs
Tariff 2013, Tariff Item 9899.00.00 00, online: <www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/trade-commerce/
tariff-tarif/2013/01-99/ch98-2013-eng.pdf>; 18 U.S.C. § 1462.
R. v. Daniels, 2004 NLSCTD 27, 2004 CarswellNfld 62 (N.L. T.D.) at para. 22, affirmed
2004 CarswellNfld 363 (N.L. C.A.).
Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 287, art. 9(1)(d). See also ibid, Explanatory Report
at para 97.
U.S. v. Barevich, 445 F.3d 956 (7th Cir., 2006) at p. 959; U.S. v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837
(7th Cir., 2001) at p. 839.
U.S. v. Ellison, 113 F.3d 77 (7th Cir., 1997) at p. 81. See also U.S. v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131
(6th Cir., 1990) at p. 1137; U.S. v. Watzman, 486 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir., 2007) at p. 1010.
Such an offence has also been proposed by the European Commission; E.C., Report on

166 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[13 C.J.L.T.]

For example, in Australia it is an offence for a person to intentionally use a
carriage service to access material, being reckless as to whether that material is
child pornography or child abuse material.319 Similarly, in Canada it is an
offence to ‘‘access” child pornography, where ‘‘accesses” means ‘‘knowingly
causes child pornography to be viewed by. . .himself or herself.” 320 Similar
principles may be applied to obscene material, as in the United States where it is
an offence to knowingly import or receive, including by use of an interactive
computer service, obscene material.321
In the online context, charges of procuring and possession may be based on
the same conduct, and may be justified on precisely the same bases. 322 However,
the distinction between possession and procuring has important ramifications. In
particular, it highlights the way in which technology has, to some extent,
‘‘disturbed” the distinction between public and private spaces.323 For example, it
may be argued that the private possession of extreme pornography is only
‘‘‘theoretically’” private as the procurement of the images requires social
interaction.324 However, this is largely because we no longer need to venture out
in order to view material in private. Except in scale, it is arguably no different
from receiving material in the mail. It is, however, much harder to regulate and it
is this factor which has seen the criminal law move from the public space into
personal and private possession.325
That there is a valid distinction between receiving and possessing was
accepted by the US Supreme Court in U.S. v. Whorley.326 In that case, the
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defendant was convicted of various offences in relation to Japanese anime
cartoons which had been found in his email account. The images contained
graphic depictions of children engaged in sexual acts with adults, some of it
coerced.327 He was convicted, inter alia, of knowingly receiving obscene cartoons
in interstate and foreign commerce and of sending or receiving in interstate
commerce obscene e-mails.328
The Court rejected the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1462 was unconstitutional
because it made ‘‘‘no exception for the private receipt, possession, or
viewing.’”329 Since Stanley, courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that
because the possession of obscene materials is protected, there must also be a
right to receive such materials.330 Of particular relevance in the online context,
the fact that ‘‘the private user. . . may not be prosecuted for possession of
obscenity in his home does not mean that he is entitled to import it from
abroad.”331 Because § 1462 focuses on the movement of such material in
interstate commerce, and not on simple possession, the prohibition was
constitutional.332
The US courts therefore recognize a limited private sphere in which
possession of obscene material is lawful. This is based as much on the right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment as it is on freedom of expression under the
First.333 There is, however, ‘‘no right to receive or possess obscene materials that
have been moved in interstate commerce.”334 Such a view is entirely consistent
with the prevailing view that existed prior to section 63, and that remains the case
in relation to all obscene material other than that which falls within the
provision. That is, while the government may restrict the movement of such
material, its possession remains lawful.
It may therefore be argued that the government’s objective of restricting
access to extreme pornography is more appropriately achieved via an offence of
procuring. Such an offence could be limited to online access—for example, to
conduct which involves the use of a ‘‘carriage service.” 335 This would specifically
target that conduct which is seen as problematic, bringing extreme pornography
into the jurisdiction via the Internet. While further distribution could be
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prosecuted under existing laws, it would not extend to material which has been
obtained or created other than via the Internet or similar means. Further, the
long established right to private possession would remain intact. This is
particularly significant in the modern era when a person’s ability to self-produce
(lawful) sexual material is greatly enhanced. Criminalizing possession of selfproduced images may extend to ‘‘visual expressions of thought and imagination,
even in the exceedingly private realm of solitary creation and enjoyment.” 336 If
such images disclose unlawful conduct, then the creators may be prosecuted for
that conduct. Otherwise, an offence of possession ‘‘trenches heavily on freedom
of expression while adding little to the protection the law provides.” 337

V. CONCLUSION
Obscenity laws arose in response to the proliferation of sexual images and
literature in the mid-nineteenth century, and concern as to the effect the display
of such material might have on ‘‘respectable members of society.” 338 Over the
course of the following century, a distinction was drawn between the public
display and distribution of obscene material, and its private possession. The role
of the state came to be seen as limiting the availability of such material, while a
person’s right to read or view what he or she wishes in private was preserved.
One can only imagine what our Victorian forebears would have made of the
situation in the current century, whereby all manner of pornographic material is
easily and freely available in the comfort of one’s home. While such material is
not new, its ready availability makes it easy to understand a desire to regulate
further the more extreme forms of pornography. While it is tempting to blame
things on ‘‘the Internet”, providing a coherent rationale for an offence of simple
possession, except perhaps in some limited cases, proves to be very difficult.
Arguments which are initially based in harm quickly give way to arguments
based in morality and repugnance. Comparisons with child pornography, while
rhetorically powerful, do not withstand close scrutiny. Although such
justifications can and are used to place limits on the distribution of obscene
material, they have not previously been seen as sufficient to justify an offence of
simple possession. It seems that the real difference between this and previous
censorship debates is more prosaic—the realization that the state has limited
ability to control access to such material, the vast majority of which originates
overseas.
The impotence of government to control such access is seen in the response
of punishing the user rather than the originator or distributor. The right to
private possession is therefore sacrificed in favour of ease of enforcement over
those who are within the jurisdiction, as opposed to those who produce and
distribute such material from ‘‘outside.” More fundamentally, to punish
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possession is arguably to miss the true gravamen of the conduct—the bringing of
such material into the jurisdiction. Rather than utilizing an offence of possession,
such conduct can be specifically targeted via an offence of procuring. This is
arguably consistent with the state’s role in limiting the movement and availability
of such material via public networks, while leaving the right to simple possession
intact. The fact that a person has a right to possess certain obscene material,
‘‘does not create a correlative right to force the [government] to allow the mails
or the channels of interstate or foreign commerce to be used for the purpose of
sending obscene material.”339
This is not necessarily to advocate for such a position, but rather to highlight
that the use of an offence of possession, whatever the content, provides a
sweeping ban on conduct which was not previously criminalized. In contrast, a
targeted offence of procuring retains the individual’s right to simple possession,
while restricting his or her ability to access certain material.
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